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Abstract
We analyze ways by which people decompose into groups in distributed
systems. We are interested in systems in which an agent can increase its
utility by connecting to other agents, but must also pay a cost that increases
with the size of the system. The right balance is achieved by the right size
group of agents. We formulate and analyze three intuitive and realistic games
and show how simple changes in the protocol can drastically improve the
price of anarchy of these games. In particular, we identify two important
properties for a low price of anarchy: agreement in joining the system, and
the possibility of appealing a rejection from a system. We show that the latter
property is especially important if there are some pre-existing constraints
regarding who may collaborate (or communicate) with whom.
1 Introduction
It is likely that agents will form groups when they gain from cooperation. In peer-
to-peer (P2P) systems, agents team up to share content; in multi-agent systems,
agents team up to complete a task. This motivation to cooperate is a “force” that
pushes towards grouping, and has been addressed in numerous papers (some are
surveyed below). Here, we are interested in the combination of this force with a
second force that breaks large groups into smaller ones. A group that is too large
may incur costs that are too high, such as overheads, free loaders, exposure to out-
side threats (e.g. lawsuits over intellectual properties), etc. This may decrease the
∗This work was carried out in and supported by the Technion-Microsoft Electronic-Commerce
Research Center.
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value agents get from a large group and motivate them to break it. Also, consider
biological ecosystems: A species with too few members will die out due to com-
petition and under exploitation of resources; if the species has too many members
and the resources are fixed or slow to renew, the species may die out due to over-
exploitation. This suggests that for many systems, the sweet spot lies somewhere
in the middle.
Consider the example of FP7, the current, 7th Framework Programme for sup-
porting research in Europe. One of its main goals is to form large “networks of
excellence”. Of course, the commission is not satisfied with size alone, it is in-
terested in the combination of size and quality. How can the commission obtain a
“network” satisfying both of these criteria? Clearly, the commission cannot simply
choose some set of researchers to its liking, telling them that they now form a re-
search network, and must cooperate to obtain good research results. Usually, it is
hard for the commission to find a researcher’s value unless the researcher exhibits
this value first, by submitting a proposal. In addition, the values of researchers ma-
terialize when they work with researchers with whom they find common grounds
and like to cooperate.
This scenario is similar to other cases where agents in a distributed system
decompose into smaller groups. For example, the factors mentioned above seem
to be present in a P2P system as well. First, people form such systems voluntarily.
Second, there may not be a grant, but the members do realize some benefit from
pooling their resources (music, movies, etc.) together. Third, we already noted that
a motivation is often present, for these people to form a more exclusive system,
rather than to have a very large one.
To capture these and other realistic settings, we study a model in which a de-
signer seeks to choose a connected subset of nodes in an underlying network, where
each node has a quality parameter. A group of nodes can perform the task only if
the sum of their qualities passes a certain threshold, T (we term such a group “eli-
gible”). Having passed this threshold, the success of a group positively depends on
its average quality. The designer (granting agency) wishes to award a grant of M
Euros to the best such group.
The winning group should also decide how to partition the grant money among
its members. While it may be possible for the agents to bargain on this issue,
in practice many times this is not the case. Probably due to strong social norms,
researchers simply split the money evenly. This happens in many other settings as
well. In P2P systems, the prize is the shared content, to which everyone has equal
access. In this paper, we study group composition only under the assumption that
the grant is split evenly. There is no doubt that other ways to split the grant are
possible, but we defer the study of this issue to future research.
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In this work we introduce three natural protocols/games for deciding the com-
position of groups, and study their price of anarchy (POA): [13] the ratio between
(a) the optimal (maximal) average quality of an eligible set of researchers, and (b)
the lowest average quality of a winner set that can be formed in an equilibrium
(here we use both the notions of a Nash equilibrium and of a strong equilibrium).
POA is a measure of the degradation of the efficiency of a system due to self-
ish behavior of agents; higher ratio corresponds to higher loss and poorer quality
worst case equilibria. We remark that the use of non-cooperative game theory fits
our goals better, compared to using cooperative game theory. The latter theory
is mainly concerned with the correct and most efficient way to distribute payoffs
among members of a winning coalition, hiding the workings of how the winning
coalition is formed. However, our interests are different and focus on the question:
what is the composition of the winning group, and what is its quality? Moreover,
in our model the answer to “which group wins” depends not only on the group, but
also on the competing groups.
The first protocol, the gold rush game, is a naive composition method often
used in some legacy systems (e.g. mailing lists): joining a group is done by simply
declaring (unilaterally) the will to do so. Granting agencies do not usually use such
a method. Perhaps the reason is that, as we show, its price of anarchy is very high,
bounded only by the size of the whole society. The analysis of this game is trivial,
but forms a basis for comparison, and is a good warmup.
Usually, granting agencies require some stronger condition for researchers to
join a group: at the least, that all group members agree on its composition (the list
of participants). If this method is used and the underlying collaboration network
is a clique (everyone knows everyone else), the strong price of anarchy improves
drastically, to be at most 2. While this improvement is impressive, we also show
that when the underlying collaboration network is arbitrary (in particular, not a
clique), the strong price of anarchy of this method can grow up to 3, which means
that only a third of the optimal average quality may be realized.
While the source of the high price of anarchy of the first method was the “too
easy” joining, the source of the (still rather) high price under the second method
is just the opposite – the difficulty of joining. That is, we show examples where
some winning set finds it beneficial to disallow the joining of some high value re-
searchers. We introduce a third protocol as a simple alleviation of the previous
problems: allowing those rejected high value researchers to “appeal” the rejection.
(Interestingly, a granting agency named MAGNET, of the Israeli ministry of indus-
try, uses a similar method for the joining of companies to a consortium). We show
that the strong price of anarchy of this third method is lower: at most 2 on arbitrary
networks, and even approaches 1 (the optimum) for large sets, if the collaboration
network is a complete graph. The analysis of this third method constitutes the main
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technical contribution of this paper. It shows how the topology of the collaboration
network affects quality, and what is the importance of an appeals process.
2 Related Literature
Probably, the most related paper to ours is [5]. They, too, use non-cooperative game
theory. Moreover, in their model, too, agents have values, and the sum of the values
of agents in a winning coalition must exceed a fixed threshold. However, that
model seems to focus on points that do not capture our motivating scenarios. First,
we, intentionally, focus on the competition part, and assume that the payoff to the
winning group is fixed. In contrast, there, the values of the players in the winning
coalition are also the total payoff of that coalition. This assumption drastically
affects the nature of the competition. Second, we, intentionally, focus on situations
where the social norm or physical reality dictates the equal sharing of the grant
money; our aim is to characterize the coalitions (and qualities) that will result from
the given division of the total gain. In contrast, they aim to analyze the bargaining
process through which the division of the total gain from the cooperation will be
determined. Finally, our price of anarchy evaluates the values of the winning group.
In contrast, the price of democracy they analyze becomes meaningless in our case
where there are no costs (costs are an orthogonal parameter introduced there).
[12] studies cooperative games over graphs, where only connected coalitions
S are able to extract their value v(S). This is also one of our assumptions. They
show that the unique fair way to divide the value of the grand coalition is by the
Shapley value. The current paper does not deal with dividing the value. Moreover,
here, a group may or may not win, as a function of the the actions of the players
in competing groups. This does not seem to be captured well by cooperative game
theory.
While most works in classic cooperative game theory are only remotely related
to our specific model, a series of papers on the stability of coalition structures,
see for example [6], [4], and references therein, is quite relevant to our work. They
study a setting where society splits into different coalitions, and characterizes cases
where such partitions are stable. (This seems more related than the famous stable
marriage problem [8].) Unlike the current paper, they assume that all formed coali-
tions win a prize (otherwise, clearly, no stable coalition structure will emerge). An-
other difference is that these papers do not focus on specific protocols for forming
coalitions; their main interest is in characterizing when such stable structures exist.
[9] models the creation of coalitions in a game that bears similarities to our initial
example game (the gold-rush). However, they do not aim to analyze the quality of
the resulting coalition.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on network creation games, starting
with [7]. These papers study games in which nodes decide how to form links in
order to create a connected network, and the price of anarchy is analyzed under
various assumptions. In their models, the society becomes connected. In contrast,
in our paper, the society splits to give birth to a strict subset, and the question is
whether the quality of the formed group is far from optimal because of various
strategic issues. The literature on price of anarchy is rich, see [13] for a survey.
3 Two Protocols with Opposing Policies
A granting agency wishes to award a prize of M Euros to a subset of a society of
n researchers. Each researcher i has a value vi that represents her overall quality.
A subset of researchers is eligible if (i) their sum of values is at least some given
threshold T , and (ii) they form a connected component of the underlying Collab-
oration Network (CN). For simplicity, in most of this section, we assume that the
underlying collaboration network is the complete graph, but remove this assump-
tion in subsequent sections. The granting agency aims to award the prize to a set of
researchers (“consortium”) with maximal average quality among all eligible con-
sortia. To exclude some trivial cases, we assume throughout that vi < T for every
researcher i, i.e. the researcher with the maximal value cannot take the prize on her
own. We also assume, without loss of generality, that the sum of all values is larger
than T . While the agency does not know the values of the researchers, we assume
that it can verify the values when a set of researchers submits evidence of their
value (this is the “grant proposal”). The agency constructs a protocol, by which
researchers form candidate consortia, and the best formed consortium wins and re-
ceives the prize. Two natural protocols give some intuition for possible causes of a
high price of anarchy.
The Gold-Rush Game. This protocol, as well as its analysis, are trivial. How-
ever, they serve as a basis for comparison, as well as a “warm up example”. Each
researcher submits a separate proposal, reporting (along with a proof of the re-
searcher’s value) some label, the “consortium name”. The labels are taken from
some finite set of labels L. Researchers who report the same label are understood
to belong to the same consortium. The agency awards the prize to an eligible con-
sortium with the maximal average value (in case of ties, any arbitrary (possibly
randomized) tie-breaking rule can be used). Each researcher in the winning con-
sortium receives an equal share of the prize.
In terms of game theory, the strategy of each researcher i in this game is
the label `i she chooses. The utility ui(`1, ..., `n) of i is 0 if “her” consortium
loses, and My if her consortium wins, where y is the size of the winning con-
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sortium. A tuple of strategies `1, ..., `n is a Nash equilibrium if ui(`1, ..., `n) ≥
ui(`1, ..., `i−1, `′i, `i+1, ..., `n) for every i = 1, ..., n and every `
′
i ∈ L. In other
words, in a Nash equilibrium `1, ..., `n, the utility of each researcher i is maximized
by declaring `i, given that the other researchers declare `−i = `1, ..., `i−1, `i+1, ..., `n.
It has become standard in the algorithmic game theory literature to measure the
quality of a game/protocol by its price of anarchy (POA) [10]. In our case, this
is the optimal (largest possible) average value divided by the average value of the
winning consortium in the worst Nash equilibrium. (This reflects a worst-case
point of view).
Unfortunately, the price of anarchy of the gold-rush game is very high. To show
this, it suffices to study the case of distinct values (i.e. no two values are equal) and
a complete CN. To analyze the price of anarchy, the next lemma characterizes all
Nash equilibria of this game. (Most proofs in this section are deferred to the journal
version of this paper (arxiv version at [11])).
Lemma 1. Assume that values are distinct and the CN is the complete graph. Then,
in every Nash equilibrium of the gold-rush game either no consortium forms, or all
researchers declare the same label, hence all researchers win.
This immediately implies an unbounded price of anarchy:
Theorem 1. The price of anarchy of the gold-rush game is (arbitrarily close to)
n/2.
There is another, more conceptual problem with the gold-rush game. In real-
ity, researchers (as well as P2P users) may know each other, and can coordinate
a joint deviation from the presumed equilibrium strategy, e.g. the top-value re-
searchers may coordinate to belong to an exclusive consortium. The notion of
a Nash equilibrium does not allow such coordinated deviations, and is therefore
conceptually weak for our case. A better notion is a strong (Nash) equilibrium,
which requires that no subset of the players can jointly deviate and increase each
of their utilities [3]. Formally, a tuple of strategies `1, ..., `n is a strong equi-
librium if for any `′1, ..., `′n ∈ L there exists a player i such that `′i 6= `i and
ui(`1, ..., `n) ≥ ui(`′1, ..., `′n). However, consider the situation where there exists
at least one eligible group that is a strict subset of the society. One of these groups
has maximal average value and should be a winner. Informally, all researchers not
in this group will like to switch their labels to the winners but the winners will like
to defect as a group to a different label by themselves. This leads to the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. If there exists an eligible group which is a strict subset of the society,
there does not exist even a single strong equilibrium in the gold-rush game.
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Consensual consortium composition (CCC). Intuitively, the bad price of anar-
chy of the gold-rush game resulted from the fact that it was “too easy” for anybody
to join a consortium of her liking. The following Consensual Consortium Com-
position (CCC) game is a first attempt to fix the problems of the previous naive
design. In this game, each player submits a “proposal:” her value and a list of
the researchers in her consortium. An eligible consortium of researchers X then
satisfies (1; consistency) each researcher in X submitted X as her consortium, (2;
threshold)
∑
i∈X vi ≥ T , and (3; connectivity) the consortium is connected in the
underlying CN. The winning consortium is an eligible consortium with maximal
average value. If several such consortia exist, the winning one has minimal size.
As discussed above, Nash equilibrium is not really appropriate in our context.
In fact, for the CCC game, a Nash equilibrium is meaningless. The reader can
verify that in this game, any partition of the players into consortia will constitute
a Nash equilibrium. We focus on the stronger and more appropriate notion of a
strong equilibrium. Analogous to PoA, strong price of anarchy (SPOA) [1] in our
case is the ratio of the largest average value to the average value of the winning
consortium in the worst strong equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Assume that CN is a clique. Fix an arbitrary tuple of researcher
values, and suppose that a minimal eligible consortium with the highest average
value has size k. Then, the strong price of anarchy of the CCC game is (arbitrarily
close to) 1 + 1k−1 . In particular, the SPOA of the CCC game is at most 2.
Proof. Assume the CN is the complete graph. Fix a tuple of values v1, ..., vn. Let
OPT be a minimal eligible consortium with highest average value, and denote
|OPT | = k. Let i ∈ OPT be a player with a lowest value among all players in
OPT . Then,
∑
j∈OPT\{i} vj < T : if all values in OPT are equal, this follows
from the minimality of OPT . If not all values in OPT are equal the inequality
follows since otherwise OPT \ {i} is an eligible consortium with a higher average
value thanOPT . The average value ofOPT \{i} is, therefore, at most Tk−1 . Thus,
the average value of OPT is also at most Tk−1 .
Now, let W be the winner consortium in some strong equilibrium. If |W | =
l < k then there exists an eligible consortium with l < k researchers. Thus, the
l players with l highest values form an eligible consortium with average value not
smaller than that of OPT , a contradiction. If |W | > k then W cannot be a strong
equilibrium. This is because players in OPT can deviate, form a consortium, win,
and increase their utility (since the size of the winning subset strictly decreases).
Thus, |W | = k. Since the sum of values of players in W is at least T , the average
value of players in W is at least Tk .
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By the previous conclusions, the ratio of the average value of players in OPT
to the average value of players in W is at most kk−1 . This proves that the SPOA of
the CCC game is at most 1 + 1k−1 .
To prove a matching lower bound, an example (for every given k) suffices. For
this purpose, consider the following tuple of values, for any small enough  > 0.
There are k researchers 1, ..., k, all with the same value Tk−1 − , and researcher
k + 1 with value k. In this case, the eligible consortium with the highest average
value (of Tk−1 − ) is {1, ..., k}. Having researchers {1, ..., k − 1, k + 1} form one
consortium, excluding researcher k, is a strong equilibrium – one can verify that
no subset can deviate and strictly increase each of their utilities. Thus, the SPOA
in this case approaches kk−1 as  approaches 0.
When the CN is not a complete graph, this theorem is not necessarily true.
Figure 1 shows an example of a non-clique CN and player values such that the
SPOA is 3 − , where  is an arbitrarily small constant. We conjecture that 3 is
the correct bound. We remark that for the CCC game a strong equilibria always
exists, see Lemma 4. The figure demonstrates another interesting phenomenon:
the optimal consortium is not necessarily a strong equilibrium. Here, the central
node will prevent the formation of the optimal group.
T − 2
T − 2
εεε
ε
T − 2
T − 2ε
ε
k
Figure 1: The SPOA for a CCC game on a CN can be arbitrarily close to 3. Here,
the nodes are labeled with their values: T is the threshold,  is an arbitrarily small
value. The worst equilibria is shown in the box: the other nodes and the central 
node form the optimal group.
4 Main Result: MAGNET CCC Game for arbitrary Col-
laboration Networks
As shown above, the quality of the winning group of the CCC game may be only
one third of the optimal quality. We show how to improve the SPOA to 2 for any
collaboration network; for the complete graph this it will become close to 1. For
this purpose, we introduce an extension of the CCC game which proceeds over
multiple rounds (the name is inspired by a policy of the MAGNET Israeli granting
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agency which uses a similar policy). The MAGNET CCC Game is defined as
follows:
• In round 1, execute the CCC game. Let the winning consortium be W1. In
each round r > 1 the winning consortium Wr is an expansion of Wr−1.
• In round r > 1, each researcher not in Wr−1 can “submit an appeal” – a
proposal consisting (as in CCC) of evidence of value and a list of researchers
in her consortium. The winning consortium Wr in round r is the union of
Wr−1 and all appealing consortia X that satisfy (1; connectivity) X ∪Wr−1
is a connected component in CN, (2; consistency), each researcher in X
submitted X as her consortium, and (3; Improvement) avg(X ∪ Wr) >
avg(Wr−1).
• The game ends if Wr =Wr−1 (no justified appeals).
We next analyze the SPOA of this game, first for any arbitraryCN, then for specific
graph structures.
4.1 Analysis of SPOA for arbitrary CN
This section shows the main technical result of the paper: The MAGNET CCC
Game has SPOA that is equal to exactly 2, regardless of the topology of the CN.
To prove this, we first identify some properties that any winning consortium in
the MAGNET CCC Game must have. Throughout, we denote by SOW (Social
Optimum Winner) a minimal eligible consortium among all eligible consortia with
maximal average value.
Lemma 3. Let Z be the winning consortium in some strong equilibrium outcome
of some arbitrary instance of the MAGNET CCC Game. Then,
1. Z ∩ SOW 6= ∅
2. |Z| ≤ |SOW |
3. avg(Z) ≥ avg(SOW \ Z)
Proof. 1. Z ∩ SOW 6= ∅: If Z is not an SOW, Z can win only if it can prevent
the formation of SOW . This can happen only if Z has some member(s) of
SOW i.e. Z ∩ SOW 6= ∅.
2. |Z| ≤ |SOW |: If |Z| > |SOW |, the players in Z∩SOW can improve their
utility by forming the smaller consortium SOW in the first round, which is
a sure winner (having the highest average). Thus, |Z| ≤ |SOW |.
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3. avg(Z) ≥ avg(SOW \ Z): If avg(Z) < avg(SOW \ Z), the players in
SOW \Z can become winners which is a contradiction. They can appeal to-
gether after the currently last round. Since both SOW and Z are connected,
so is SOW ∪Z. Since avg(Z) < avg(SOW \Z), SOW \Z can be added
as winners.
Lemma 4. The MAGNET CCC Game always has a Strong Equilibrim (S.E.)
Proof. If SOW is not a S.E., there is a winning consortium Z having non-empty
intersection with SOW and of size strictly smaller than SOW . If Z is not a S.E.,
some nodes of Z can deviate. I.e., these nodes (maybe with other nodes) can form
a consortium Z ′ having non-empty intersection with SOW and of size strictly
smaller than Z. Since this process is finite, we must reach a subset Z ′′ that is a
S.E.
Theorem 3. The SPOA of MAGNET CCC Game ≤ 2.
Proof. Denote |SOW | = k. By definition,
SPOA =
avg(SOW )
avg(Z)
=
sum(SOW∩Z)
k +
sum(SOW\Z)
k
avg(Z)
(1)
We prove two properties:
1. sum(SOW ∩ Z)/k ≤ avg(Z) : obviously sum(SOW ∩ Z) ≤ sum(Z).
By Lemma 3, |Z| ≤ k. Thus,
sum(SOW ∩ Z)
k
≤ sum(Z)
k
≤ sum(Z)|Z| = avg(Z)
2. sum(SOW \ Z)/k ≤ avg(Z) : By Lemma 3, avg(Z) ≥ avg(SOW \ Z).
Thus,
sum(SOW \ Z)
k
≤ sum(SOW \ Z)|SOW \ Z|
= avg(SOW \ Z) ≤ avg(Z)
Plugging into equation 1, we get:
SPOA =
sum(SOW ∩ Z)/k + sum(SOW \ Z)/k
avg(Z)
≤ avg(Z) + avg(Z)
avg(Z)
= 2
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0 0 00
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T(n−1)/n
Figure 2: For the MAGNET CCC Game a Collaboration Network with a price of
anarchy arbitrarily close to 2.
Figure 2 shows an example with SPOA = 2 − , where  is an arbitrarily small
constant. The SOW consists of the two players with values T (n−1)n and T − ,
coupled with their intermediary players that have zero values. The worst strong
equilibrium here is the consortium containing the two players with values  and
T − , coupled with their intermediary players that have zero values. This gives
SPOA = 2n−1n − T , which can be made arbitrarily close to 2.
4.2 Dependency on graph parameters
The previous analysis showed a SPOA of 2 for arbitrary graph structures. We show
how the SPOA may depend on the structure of the graph. In particular, we consider
two extreme special cases: the complete graph on one hand, and the line network
on the other hand. These two cases result from differences in the diameter and the
connectivity.
The Complete Graph. In the CCC game, this case has SPOA 1 + 1k−1 (k =
|SOW |). The multiple round version improves this bound to be 1 + 1k . While the
improvement is small for large SOW ’s, for small SOW ’s it is quite significant,
e.g. the SPOA can decrease from 2 (with one round) to 1.5 (with multiple rounds).
Theorem 4. The SPOA of the MAGNET CCCGame over a completeCG is exactly
1 + 1k , where k = |SOW |.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn. The proof
relies on the following two observations (full proof deferred to the journal version):
Observation 1. For the case of the complete graph, every SOW consortium has
size k, where k is such that
∑k−1
i=1 vi < T and
∑k
i=1 vi ≥ T .
Observation 2. For the case of the complete graph, the size of any winner con-
sortium in a strong equilibrium outcome must be equal to the size of the SOW
consortium.
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Lemma 5. There exists an instance of the MAGNET CCC Game over a complete
CN for which the strong price of anarchy is arbitrarily close to 1 + 1k , where
k = |SOW |.
Proof. Fix k, and consider the following tuple of values, for any  > 0: There are
k−2 researchers 1, . . . , k−2 with the same value Tk−1 . Researchers k−1, k, k+1
have values Tk−1 − , Tk , and  respectively. In this case, the eligible consortium
with the highest average is 1, . . . , k having average T+T/k−k . The worst strong
equilibrium has the winner as the consortium 1, . . . , k− 1, k+1. This has average
T
k , hence the strong price of anarchy approaches 1 +
1
k as  approaches 0.
The Line Network. This is the other extreme. Here, the SPOA grows and ap-
proaches 2 as the size of the SOW increases (Theorem 5). In contrast, in a complete
graph (as shown above), the SPOA shrinks and approaches 1 as the size of the SOW
increases. Intuitively, it seems that this 100% increase (from the optimum) in the
case of a line results from the growth of the diameter when k grows. On the other
hand, the disappearance of the price of anarchy (convergence to 1) in the case of a
complete graph seems to result from the increase in connectivity.
Theorem 5. In the MAGNET CCC Game over a line CN, the SPOA is (arbitrarily
close to) 1 + k−1k (k = |SOW |).
Proof. Let W be the winner in a worst strong equilibrium, and let k′ = |SOW \
W |. By Lemma 3, k′ ≤ k − 1 (since SOW ∩W is not empty), and avg(SOW \
W ) ≤ avg(W ). Hence, sum(SOW \W ) ≤ k′ · avg(W ). By the same lemma,
|W | ≤ k, and k · avg(W ) ≥ sum(W ) > sum(SOW ∩W ). All these imply:
SPOA =
avg(SOW )
avg(W )
=
sum(SOW\W )
k +
sum(SOW∩W )
k
avg(W )
≤
k′·avg(W )
k +
sum(SOW∩W )
k
avg(W )
=
k′
k
+
sum(SOW ∩W )
k · avg(W ) ≤
k − 1
k
+ 1.
The other direction is shown via the example in Figure 2, using |SOW | = n
(specifically, the SPOA there is 2n−1n − T = 1+ k−1k − T for any arbitrarily small
 > 0).
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4.3 Additional Issues
We briefly discuss the following two important issues:
4.3.1 Using a notion of strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
Since the MAGNET CCC Gameis an extensive-form game, one may wonder whether
it is more appropriate to use a notion of Strong Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE)
instead of Strong Equilibria. We note that such a change will not change our price
of anarchy analysis. First, clearly, every SSPE is also a SE. Thus, using SSPE in-
stead of SE can only decrease the price of anarchy. Second, we note that if W is
the winner consortium in some strong equilibrium, then there is also a Strong Sub-
game Perfect Equilibrium of the MAGNET CCC Game in which W is the winner
consortium. This is the tuple of strategies where the researchers in W submit a
proposal together already in the first step of the game. In this there will be only
one step, and the two notions become the same. Therefore, the price of anarchy is
the same, regardless of which notion we use.
4.3.2 Strong Price of Stability
Another useful concept analogous to the price of anarchy is the price of stability
(POS) [2]. Analogous to SPOA, one can define Strong Price of Stability (SPOS) as
the ratio of the optimum to a best strong equilibrium. In our game, this is the ratio
of the optimal (largest possible) average value to the average value of the winning
consortium in the best strong equilibrium. We do not analyze SPOS in detail in this
paper, but we wish to note via an example described in Figure 3 that in MAGNET
CCC Game, the SPOS can be greater than 1.
T/4
T−ε0ε εT− 00
0
Figure 3: The Strong Price of Stability for the MAGNET CCC Game can be greater
than 1. The figure shows the best Strong Equilibria (green, solid lines) that yields a
SPOS of 6/5. For comparison, the worst Strong Equilibria is shown in red, dashed
lines showing a SPOA of 3/2.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper looks at the process of agents teaming up to construct distributed sys-
tems. Our setting addresses a specific scenario where one driving force/ incentive
limits the size of the consortium, but another increases it. We made some simple
assumptions. We assumed that the value of a researcher is independent of the mem-
bers of its consortium. We also assumed that the Euro amount of the grant is fixed.
What if these assumptions did not hold? What if the grant were some function of
the set size?
There are many other interesting directions to explore. We could have more
sophisticated utility functions or game designer goals, or we could study “natural”
games (i.e. not design mechanisms but look at existing systems). We can study
more involved environments; such as an evolving dynamic environment where new
researchers are born and old ones retire. What about composition of multiple sys-
tems? Could multiple consortiums form simultaneously or in reaction to other
formations? Would there be a domino effect? Is there a relation between the topol-
ogy of collaboration networks and consortium composition? Our work indicates
there may be influence of both connectivity and diameter on the SPOA. How does
the choice of a threshold (which influences the consortium size) influence SPOA?
Can we propose mechanisms that further improve SPOA? The MAGNET game
is a multi-round game. There are known results transforming multi-round games
to single round but these involve various penalties and assumptions. Can we pro-
vide a more efficient reduction in our context? We have assumed the players to be
fully rational in their decision making; it will be interesting to study such games in
context of bounded rationality and also with players having limited information of
their neighborhood as in a distributed network setup.
Finally, we would like to abstractly define, eventually, the class of distributed
systems formation games making it easier to understand the various trade-offs and
parameters.
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